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Left	  problems,	  nationalism	  and	  the	  crisis	  	  Crises	  abound.	   	  Crises	   that	  might	  be	  productively	  seized,	  or	  crises	   that	  usher	   in	  a	  new	  threshold	   of	   capitalist	   governance	   no	   longer	   tempered	   by	   the	   nominal	   equality	   of	  juridical	   liberalism	   or	   the	   egalitarian	   reflexes	   of	   redistributive	   social	   democracy.	  Whatever	  else	  Brexit,	  Trump,	  Farage,	  Le	  Pen,	  Sanders	  and	  now	  Corbyn	  are,	  they	  all	  seem	  to	  indicate	  a	  crisis	  –	  a	  moment	  of	  rupture,	  a	  proliferation	  of	  new	  horizons,	  and	  a	  centre	  that	  cannot	  hold.	  On	  the	  left,	  the	  ‘full	  automation	  now’	  and	  universal	  basic	  income	  Neo-­‐Keynesianism	   of	   the	   bright	   young	   things	   finds	   affinity	   in	   the	   avuncular	   socialism	   of	  Sanders	  and	  Corbyn.	  Elsewhere,	  a	  popular	  authoritarianism,	  committed	  amongst	  other	  things	   to	  overseeing	   the	   full	   ravages	  of	   climate	   change,	  butts	  up	  against	   far	   right	  neo-­‐reactionism.	  	  Many	   of	   these	   positions	   found	   some	   degree	   of	   articulation	   in	   the	   run	   up	   to	   the	   2017	  General	  Election	  –	  an	  election	  initially	  intended	  to	  clear	  the	  path	  for	  Teresa	  May's	  Home	  Office	   styled	  authoritarianism.	   Thankfully,	   Jeremy	   Corbyn’s	   Labour	   party	   won	   an	  unexpected	   number	   of	   seats,	   forcing	   a	   shift	   in	   parliamentary	   discourse.	   This	   shift	  moderated	   right	   wing	   populist	   vehemence,	   and,	   following	   the	   tragedy	   of	   Grenfell,	  contributed	   towards	   a	   renewed	   consideration	   of	   social	   welfare.	   However,	   before	   that	  transpired,	   what	   Emejulu	   terms	   an	   emboldened	   ‘revanchist’	   nationalism	   had	   already	  consolidated	  itself	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  English	  politics,	  and,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  renewed	  optimism	  of	  the	  Corbyn	  moment,	  that	  formation	  has	  only	  marginally	  dissipated.	   
 Much	  of	  the	  past	  decade	  had	  after	  all	  seen	  nationalism	  become	  the	  most	  reliable	  broker	  of	  electoral	  power.	  It	  had	  informed	  the	  rise	  of	  far-­‐right	  populisms	  whilst	  also	  fortifying	  centre-­‐right	   rule	   across	   the	   West.	   This	   nationalist	   revival	   manifested	   along	   multiple	  registers.	   At	   times,	   the	   emphasis	   is	   economic	   protectionism.	   Elsewhere,	   it	   rails,	   not	  without	   justification,	   against	   the	   dictates	   and	   opacity	   of	   various	   supranational	  institutions,	  not	   least	   the	  European	  Union.	  Sometimes,	   it	  amounts	  primarily	  to	  a	  rustic	  nostalgia	   for	   something	   primordial.	   Common,	   however,	   is	   a	   consistent	   compulsion	   to	  place	   the	   bulk	   of	   a	   society’s	   challenges	   at	   the	   door	   of	   racialised	   ethnic	   communities,	  domestic	  and	  foreign.	  	  As	   western	   capitalism	   reneges	   on	   some	   of	   its	   key	   promises	   of	   the	   trente	   glorieuses	  (1945-­‐1975),	   it	   is	   painfully	   frustrating	   that	   nationalism	   is	   rehabilitated	   as	   the	   most	  likely	  custodian	  of	  political	  discourse.	  It	  is	  doubly	  frustrating	  that	  some	  who	  propagate	  for	   a	   left	   alternative	   also	   seem	   wedded	   to	   the	   nation	   –	   in	   asserting	   control	   over	  migration,	  over	  defence,	  over	  security,	  and	  over	  how	  we	  imagine	  our	  everyday	  sense	  of	  community.	   As	   these	   frustrations	  multiply,	   we	   believe	   it	   timely	   to	   sketch	   out	   a	  more	  historically	  attuned	  reckoning	  of	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  current	  crisis	  and	  xeno-­‐racist	  nationalism,	  including	  an	  engagement	  with	  whiteness	  and	  the	  working	  class.	  At	  its	  simplest,	  we	  only	  wish	  to	  press	  the	  importance	  of	  recognising	  the	  central	  role	  of	  racial	  nationalism	  in	  recent	  governance.	  Our	  more	  overarching	  contention	  is	  that	  a	  realisation	  of	  alternative	  left	  visions	  for	  governance	  must	  as	  a	  minimum	  start	  with	  the	  repudiation	  of	  xeno-­‐racism’s	  hold	  on	  contemporary	  politics,	  and	  the	  left’s	  routine	  submission	  to	  its	  lustre.	  	  That	   reckoning	   is,	   in	   a	   small	  way,	   necessary	   to	   appreciate	   the	   initial	   electoral	   success	  delivered	  by	  a	  Corbyn-­‐led	  Labour.	  Any	  alternative	  model	  for	  mutual	  care	  and	  sociability	  
Malcolm	  James	  and	  Sivamohan	  Valluvan	  	  
	   2	  
will	   be	   sustained	   by	   energies	   outside	   the	   Labour	   party,	   not	   within	   it.	   But	   it	   is	  nonetheless	  vital	  to	  note	  that	  Corbyn	  not	  only	  insisted	  on	  a	  substantial	  social	  democratic	  programme	   –	   rare	   to	   recent	   centre-­‐left	   agendas;	   but	   he	   also	   declined	   the	   call	   to	   rally	  nationalist	   shibboleths	   –	   although	   he	   did	   not	   advocate	   for	  migrants’	   rights	   either.	  His	  partial	   success	   is	   then	   accounted	   for	   by	   not	   having	   bartered	   with	   key	   nationalist	  agitations.	   Instead	   of	   capitulating	   to	   nationalist	   populisms,	   he	   presented	   an	   anti-­‐establishment	  social	  democracy	  with	  popular	  appeal.	  	  But	  to	  say	  this,	  is	  also	  to	  note	  that	  nationalist	  agitations	  remain	  intact.	  As	  the	  dust	  settles	  on	   the	   election,	   nationalism	   has	   begun	   to	   return	   to	   left	   politics,	   parliamentary	   and	  otherwise,	   because	   it	   never	   left.	   In	   parliamentary	   Labour,	   we	   see	   Corbyn’s	   initial	  quietism	  on	  migrants’	   rights	  accumulating	  a	  more	  recognisable	  anti-­‐migrant	   language;	  we	  see	  it	  in	  the	  recent	  pronouncements	  of	  MPs	  Gloria	  De	  Piero	  and	  Graham	  Jones	  on	  the	  white	  working	   class;	   and	  we	   see	   it	   in	   the	   formation	  of	   John	  Denham’s	  English	  Labour	  Network.	  As	   such,	  aside	   from	  a	   limited	  defeat	  of	   right	  wing	  authoritarianism,	   it	   seems	  little	  else	  has	  changed.	  Optimism	  has	  certainly	  returned,	  even	  the	  word	  ‘socialism’,	  but	  the	  crisis	  which	  forged	  the	  nationalist	  demand,	  which	  props	  up	  its	  contradictions,	  which	  keeps	  Philip	  May’s	  investments	  in	  tax	  avoiding	  multinationals	  healthy,	  is	  still	  very	  much	  a	  reality.	  The	  left	  must	  then	  not	  only	  reject	  nationalism	  but	  do	  so	  on	  certain	  terms,	  based	  on	  a	  solid	  understanding	  of	  the	  contemporary	  crisis	  in	  which	  it	  arises.	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  As	  with	  so	  many	  times	  before,	  Stuart	  Hall	  helps	  us	  answer	  this	  call.	  	  Until	  recently	  a	  less	  used	  dimension	  of	  his	  vocabulary,	  Hall’s	   commentary	  on	   the	   ‘crisis’	  has	  been	   recalled.	  The	  parallels	  between	  now	  and	  then	  are	  clear	  enough.	  Hall’s	  crisis	  of	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  social	   democracy	   is	   after	   all	   the	   direct	   antecedent	   of	   our	   own,	   wherein	   the	   popular	  gradually	  yielded	  to	  the	  populist.	  	  Hall	  observed	  how	  under	  Callaghan,	  but	  more	  prominently	   in	  Thatcherism,	   the	   formal	  ideals	   of	   democracy	   became	   eroded,	   accruing	   a	  more	   authoritarian	   guise.	   As	  market-­‐society	   programmes	   were	   enforced,	   the	   broader	   conditions	   necessary	   for	   labour	  security,	   social	  mobility,	   comprehensive	  public	  provisions,	   and	  affordable	  networks	  of	  community	   based	   leisure	   dissipated.	   Confidence	   in	   the	   democratic	   contract	   was	  accordingly	   threatened.	   What	   supplanted	   the	   resulting	   democratic	   void	   was	   an	  intensified	   emphasis	   on	   belonging	   to	   the	   nation;	   a	   belonging	   premised	   on	   certain	  fundamental	   exclusions.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   this	   was	   a	   renewed	   and	   affirming	   cult	   of	  belonging	  based	  on	  identifying	  the	  threats	  posed	  by	  generally	  racial,	  frequently	  classed,	  and	   sometimes	   unionised,	   outsiders.	   Here,	   a	   familiar	   cast	   of	   pathological	   presences	  begin	  to	  obtain	  their	  fuller	  political	  definition	  –	  the	  nihilistic	  black	  male,	  the	  degeneracy	  of	   the	   multi-­‐ethnic	   inner	   city,	   and,	   not	   least,	   the	   (increasingly	   Muslim)	   migrants	  ‘swamping’	  the	  realm.	  These	  appeared	  alongside	  the	  periodic	  assertion	  of	  remembered	  imperial	   glory	   via	   select	   military	   campaigns	   –	   the	   Northern	   Ireland	   Troubles	   and	  Falklands	  being	  particularly	  significant.	  The	   slide	   towards	   nationalist	   authoritarianism	   could	   then	   be	   narrated	   (employing	   a	  degree	  of	  hyperbole)	  along	  the	  following	  lines.	  	  The	  democratic	  project	  no	  longer	  hinged	  on	   the	   conception	   of	   a	   collective	   good;	   no	   longer	   aspired	   to	   deliver	   a	   shared	   social	  arrangement;	  no	   longer	  envisioned	  a	  society	  that	  could	  deliver	  a	  socio-­‐economic	  stake	  for	   all	   its	   denizens.	   Instead,	   the	   democratic	   moved	   its	   operational	   centre	   towards	  identifying	  populist	  objects	  of	  threat,	  disruption,	  decay	  and	  dependency	  amidst	  both	  the	  body	   politic	   and	   at	   its	   borders.	   For	   Hall,	   this	   was	   not	   the	   same	   as	   saying	   racialised	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alarmism	  and	  policing	  offered	  cover	  for	  market	  reforms,	  though	  it	  is	  partly	  that.	  It	  was	  to	   note	   the	  more	   fundamental	   shift	   in	   the	   locus	   of	   democratic	   governance	   and	   desire	  itself	  –	  a	  pivot	  toward	  authoritarian	  populism,	  understood	  elsewhere	  as	  ‘parliamentary	  dictatorship’,	  collected	  and	  sutured	  by	  nationalism.	  Of	   course,	   the	   advent	   of	   Blairism	   seemed	   initially	   to	   constitute	   a	   departure	   from	   this	  doubling	  of	  capital	  and	  nation.	   	  While	  Blairism	  certainly	  represented	  the	  consolidation	  of	   neoliberal	   common	   sense,	   tying	   the	   cult	   of	   enterprise	   and	   the	   animal	   spirits	   of	  competition	  to	  an	  edifice	  of	  urban	  chic,	   it	  also	  momentarily	  muted	  the	   little	  Englander	  defensiveness	   characteristic	   of	   Thatcherite	   neoliberalism.	   This	   reading	   is	   however	  something	  of	  a	  misnomer.	  First,	  the	  initial	  (if	  piecemeal)	  commitments	  to	  race	  equality	  legislation	   and	   multicultural	   Britain	   was	   in	   actuality	   awkwardly	   embedded	   within	   a	  resurgent	   core	  of	  white	  popular	   cool,	   as	   embodied	  by	   indie	  band	  Blur	   and	   its	  up-­‐beat	  white	   nostalgia.	   Second,	   the	   move	   away	   from	   heavily	   worn	   assertions	   of	   Britishness,	  minority	   threat	   and	   xeno-­‐racism	   was	   largely	   reversed	   through	   the	   return	   to	   a	  	  ‘community	  cohesion’	  thesis	  borne	  out	  of	  the	  2001	  northern	  disturbances	  and	  increased	  hectoring	   against	   asylum	   seekers.	   This	   general	   recourse	   to	   integrationism	   was	   then	  indirectly	   hitched	   to	   the	   already	   available	   imperial	   nostalgia,	   lived	   through	   and	  repackaged	   in	   a	   manner	   suitable	   for	   early	   Twenty-­‐first	   Century	   sensibilities	   via	   the	  militarism	  of	  2001	  onward,	  but	  already	  primed	  in	  the	  seeming	  successes	  of	  Kosovo	  and	  the	  Ivory	  Coast.	  	  It	   was	   of	   course	   not	   only	   the	   Labour	   Party	   that	   rehearsed	   the	   return	   of	   nationalism.	  After	   a	   confident	   first	   three	   years,	  New	  Labour	  became	   reactive,	   easily	   pressed	   into	   a	  political	   agenda	   compelled	   by	   the	   opposition	   Conservatives	   and	   its	   own	   well-­‐worn	  nationalist	   impulses.	  Failing	  to	  redistribute	  wealth	  and	  lacking	  anything	  substantive	  to	  champion	  beyond	  a	  scramble	  for	  a	   fetishized	   ‘centre’,	  as	  an	  end	  in	   itself,	  Labour	   in	  the	  2000s	   was	   apologetic	   and	   defensive,	   dancing	   uneasily	   to	   the	   tune	   of	   an	   emboldened	  right	  wing	  press.	  As	  such,	  it	  was	  during	  New	  Labour’s	  reign	  that	  the	  popular	  consensus	  around	   immigration	  as	  unequivocally	  problematic,	  Muslims	  as	  unequivocally	  ominous,	  and	  multiculturalism	  as	  unequivocally	  bust	  was	  secured.	  In	  short,	  the	  ‘soft	  racism	  of	  the	  hard	  centre’	  became	  firmly	  entrenched.	  All	  that	  subsequently	  remained	  was	  for	  its	  more	  virulent	  spokespersons	  to	  promise	  nationalism’s	  more	  spectacular	  palliative	  potential.	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  The	  resulting	  nationalist	  consolidation	  occurred	  however	  under	  conditions	  distinct	  from	  those	  discussed	  by	  Hall.	  In	  Hall’s	  analysis,	  the	  ideal	  subject	  lionised	  by	  Thatcherism	  was	  the	   self-­‐determined	   meritocratic	   individual	   –	   personified	   in	   the	   petit	   bourgeois	   shop	  owner	  (and	  therefore	  Thatcher	  herself).	  The	  threading	  of	  free	  market	  capitalist	  ideology	  through	   the	  mundane	   fabric	   of	   the	  new	   town	  and	   suburban	  high	   street	  permitted	   the	  dismantling	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  and	  the	  incremental	  application	  of	  market	   logics	  to	  all	  human	   relations.	   It	   was	   consequently	   the	   petit	   bourgeois	   Poujadist	   who	   became	   the	  ideal	  nationalist	  subject,	  characterised	  by	  a	  deep	  private	  innocence	  and	  smallness	  under	  siege,	  but	  also	  a	  familial	  innocence	  largely	  at	  home	  with	  capitalist	  mantras.	  	  Today	  the	  mythopoesis	  of	  the	  shopkeeper,	  the	  ‘self-­‐made	  man’,	  and	  the	  striver	  scarcely	  delivers	   in	  material	  terms.	   It	   is	  not	  even	  a	  consistent	  emphasis	   in	  Tory	  dogma.	  Rather,	  ‘the	   market’	   gradually	   displaces	   the	   myth	   of	   the	   shopkeeper	   as	   the	   ideal	   neoliberal	  subject.	  The	  market	  is	  of	  course	  a	  pseudonym	  for	  the	  triumph	  of	  global	  finance	  capital.	  In	  Home	  Counties’	  high	  streets,	  we	  see	  this	  operationalized	  in	  the	  Conservatives’	  house-­‐price	  indexed	  business	  rate	  hikes.	  Bases	  of	  traditional	  Conservative	  power,	  such	  as	  the	  fabled	  entrepreneur,	   are	   sacrificed	   to	   the	  exigencies	  of	   the	   corporate	  multinational,	   to	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Tesco	  and	  Costa,	  and	   to	   the	   rationales	  of	   the	  market.	  However,	   this	   shift	   from	   local	   to	  global	  is	  certainly	  not	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  nation.	  Indeed,	  the	  Brexit	  themed	  neoliberalism	  of	   global	   trade	   utopians	   Liam	   Fox,	   Nigel	   Farage,	   Boris	   Johnson	   and	   David	   Davis	  engineers	   its	   own	   potent	   version	   of	   nationalist	   assertion.	   Neoliberalism	   is	   first	   and	  foremost	  an	  ideology	  of	  enterprise	  and	  all	  objects	  come	  under	  its	  purview,	  including	  the	  nation.	  Construed	  as	  competitive,	  cost	  effective	  engines	  of	  pure	  accumulation,	  the	  nation	  too	  is	  then	  reimagined	  as	  enterprise	  –	  a	  visualisation	  with	  overtly	  colonial	  overtones.	  It	  is	  the	  ghost	  of	  the	  East	  India	  Company	  that	  haunts	  Liam	  Fox’s	  desire	  for	  an	  ‘Empire	  2.0’.	  	  This	   remains	  however	  a	  particular	   rendering	  of	   the	  national	  project	   that	   reneges	  on	  a	  formal	   affinity	   with	   Little	   England.	   It	   is	   a	   neoliberal	   project	   that	   is	   gradually	  uninterested	   in	  petty	  bourgeois	  conservatism.	  But	   this	   is	  not	   to	  say	   that	  neoliberalism	  does	  not	   continue	   to	   inform	   the	  quotidian	   fabrics	  of	   local	   life	   too.	  The	   ideology	  of	   the	  free	  market	   is	   still	   found	   in	   street	   level	   anxiety	   about	   the	   failure	   to	   self-­‐actualise	   the	  myth	  of	  merit,	  but	  these	  fixations	  with	  the	  optimising-­‐self	  sit	  alongside	  the	  reality	  of	  job	  precarity,	   income	   stagnation,	   widening	   inequality,	   diminished	   public	   services,	   the	  advent	   of	   disciplinary	  welfare	   (‘workfarism’),	   rising	   costs	   of	   living,	   accelerated	   urban	  restructuring,	   the	   formal	   end	   to	   the	   promise	   of	   social	   mobility,	   and	   increased	   social	  atomisation.	   As	   such,	   whilst	   our	   dominant	   ‘structure	   of	   feeling’	   may	   still	   be	   petit	  bourgeois	  capitalist,	  the	  truth	  is	  that	  its	  conceits	  of	  mobility	  and	  meritocracy	  run	  up	  too	  frequently	  against	  these	  social	  and	  economic	  realities.	  The	  cultural	  investment	  in	  ideals	  of	  competition	  and	  the	  sanctity	  of	  enterprise	  do	  not	  then	  even	  remotely	  align	  with	  the	  wider	   realities	   of	   socio-­‐economic	   stagnation,	   austerity	   regimes,	   and	   the	   resultant	  individual	   struggle	   and	   hardships.	   Contemporary	   neoliberalism	   is	   global-­‐hegemonic,	  and	  as	  such	  any	  promise	  of	  freedom	  it	  does	  contain	  is	  for	  the	  majority	  too	  far	  away.	  	  	  It	  is	  because	  of	  these	  realities,	  increasingly	  undeniable,	  that	  we	  are	  said	  to	  be	  currently	  witnessing	   the	   partial	   crumbling	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   consensus.	   Across	   Europe,	   more	  confident	  challenges	  to	  the	  austerity	  conceit	  are	  materialising.	  It	  is	  our	  concern	  however	  that	   the	   potential	   diminution	   of	   neoliberal	   logics	   still	   leaves	   intact	   the	   emboldened	  chauvinistic	   attachments	   to	   nation	   and	  whiteness	   that	   characterised	   the	   other	   side	   of	  that	   same	   governmental	   coin.	   Put	   differently,	   nationalism	   is	   all	   that	   remains	   of	   the	  established	   ruling	   culture	   when,	   or	   if,	   the	   consensus	   around	   neoliberalism	   and	   its	  austerity	  politics	  starts	  to	  slip.	  The	  task	  of	  a	  renewed	  non-­‐racist	  left	  should	  therefore	  be	  to	  subject	  all	  calls	  to	  nationalist	  myopia	  and	  defensiveness	  to	  the	  same	  hard-­‐won	  rebuke	  that	   leftists	   otherwise	   reserve	   for	   neoliberal	   capitalism.	   To	   soft	   pedal	   on	   this	   task,	   or	  worse	  yet,	  to	  accept	  some	  core	  nationalist	  nostrums	  would	  be	  to	  succumb	  to	  the	  shape	  of	  governance	  already	  rehearsed	  over	  recent	  history.	  Only	  now,	   its	  partial	  untethering	  from	  former	  capitalist	  bedfellows	  allows	  for	  xeno-­‐	  and	  anti-­‐Muslim	  racisms	  to	  obtain	  a	  greater	  and	  more	  pernicious	  autonomy.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  The	   ability	   to	  map	   these	  distinctions	   and	   transformations	   is	   notably	   absent	   in	   certain	  branches	  of	  the	  left.	  We	  might	  say	  that	  failure	  on	  these	  grounds	  has	  become	  habit.	  These	  corners	   of	   the	   left	   are	   even	   fond	   of	   citing	   Trump,	   Brexit	   and	   Le	   Pen	   as	   the	   result	   of	  straightforward	  anti-­‐capitalist	   impulses.	  This	  version	  of	  the	  crisis	  critique,	  endorsed	  in	  part	   by	   journalist	   Paul	   Mason,	   and	   often	   put	   forward	   by	   merchants	   of	   progressive	  contrarianism	   and/or	   self-­‐styled	   spokespersons	   of	   working-­‐class	   authenticity,	   then	  accepts	   retrenchment	   to	   the	   nation	   as	   an	   anti-­‐neoliberal	   move.	   The	   fact	   that	   some	  middle-­‐class	  people	  oppose	  nationalism	  further	  compounds	  their	  mistaken	  notion	  that	  the	  new	  nationalist	  cry	  must	  be	  anti-­‐capitalist,	  or	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  a	  recognisable	  act	  of	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anti-­‐elite,	   working-­‐class	   assertion.	   This	   is	   bad	   Marxism	   done	   worse.	   It	   takes	   the	  metaphor	   of	   oppositional	   class	   interests	   and	   writes	   it	   into	   every	   streak,	   corner	   and	  recess	   of	   culture	   and	   ideology.	   Such	   arguments	   have	   already	   received	   some	   critical	  attention,	  but	  its	  continued	  prominence	  in	  left-­‐nationalist	  circles	  means	  it	  merits	  more.	  And	  whilst	  we	  cannot	  address	  here	  every	  rendition	  of	  how	  nationalism	  obtains	  a	  leftist	  inflection,	   we	   do	   want	   to	   isolate	   here	   a	   select	   few	   angles	   that	   we	   believe	   to	   be	  particularly	  misleading.	  	  A	  prominent	   left-­‐nationalist	  move	   regarding	   contemporary	   crisis	   is	   the	   ‘working	   class	  has	   spoken’	   ploy.	   Here,	   the	   multiple	   dimensions	   of	   nationalism	   are	   reduced	   to	   a	  working-­‐class	   politics,	   an	   insurrection	   via	   the	   ballot	   box.	   Anti-­‐immigration	   becomes	   a	  normalised	   sentiment	   of	   working	   class	   populations	   (denying	   the	   petit	   bourgeois	  triumph	   that	   the	   nation	   actually	   is)	   at	   the	   same	   time	   as	   it	   is	   read	   as	   anti-­‐capitalist	  politics	  (as	  opposed	  to	  the	  anti-­‐minority	  xeno-­‐racism	  that	  it	  so	  belligerently	  affirms).	  	  One	   trope	   key	   to	   this	   reading	   of	   Brexit,	   Trump	   and	   aspects	   of	   May	   is	   a	   supposed	  ‘cosmopolitanism’	   versus	   ‘working	   class	   culture’	   distinction.	   	   This	   distinction	   has	   two	  dimensions.	   First,	   it	   is	   said	   that	   the	   working	   class	   lacks	   the	   resources	   to	   cultivate	  attitudes	  more	  receptive	  to	   immigration	  and	   its	  resultant	  ethnic	  diversity;	  and	  second,	  cosmopolitanism	   (read	   multiculture	   and	   anti-­‐racism)	   is	   characterised	   as	   merely	   an	  exercise	  in	  middle	  class	  metropolitan	  self-­‐aggrandisement	  and	  ultimately	  superfluous	  to	  any	   genuinely	   progressive	  project.	   This	   argument,	   recently	   aired	  by	  Wolfgang	   Streeck	  but	  apparent	  in	  other	  commentaries	  on	  class	  and	  culture,	  alleges	  that	  a	  resource	  deficit	  is	  said	  to	  explain	  resentment	  towards	  migration	  and	  ethnic	  diversity	  among	  the	  working	  class.	  And,	  by	  the	  same	  token,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  cosmopolitan	  resources	  are	  the	  preserve	  of	   the	  middle	   classes.	   Ignorance	  of	   this	   resource	  deficit	   is	   then	  put	  down	   to	   the	   smug	  arrogance	  of	  metropolitan	  elites.	  	  Some	   important	   truths	   need	   restating	   here.	   First,	   this	   above	   conceit	   ignores	   many	  apparent	   dynamics	   of	   our	   cities.	   The	   unspectacular	   commitment	   to	   multiculture	  occasioned	   by	   the	   quotidian	   textures	   of	  much	   urban	   life,	   that	   is	   to	   say	   a	   city	   habitus	  common	  to	  many	  black,	  brown	  and	  white	  working	  class	  people,	  is	  well-­‐documented.	  	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  seriously	  justify	  the	  suggestion	  that	  an	  alleged	  liberal	  middle	  class	  has	  the	  resource	  monopoly	  on	  cosmopolitanism.i	  Although	  many	  middle	  class	  people	  might	  nominally	   share	   the	   rhetorical	   commitment	   to	   multiculturalism,	   they	   are	   scarcely	   its	  only	   or	   even	   primary	   agents	   or	   symbols.	   Indeed,	   much,	   though	   not	   all,	   of	   what	   is	  narrated	  as	  being	  a	  middle	  class	  embrace	  of	  cosmopolitanism	  might	   rather	  be	  seen	  as	  the	   rather	   thin	  marketplace	  consumption	  of	  ethnic	  diversity.	   It	   is	  often	  a	   form	  of	   cosy	  realisation	   of	   self	   via	   consumer	  discernment	   –	   rather	   than	   an	   extension	   of	   sociability,	  care	   and	   concern	   –	   that	   is	   sometimes	   forgotten	   when	   Polish	   off	   licences	   outnumber	  bespoke	   coffee	   shops,	   when	   multicultural	   neighbours	   become	   noisy	   nuisances,	   and	  when	   these	  personal	  discomforts	  are	  weaponised	   through	   the	  police,	   spending	  power,	  and	  property	  prices.	  	  To	  reiterate,	   the	  reality	  of	  many	  urban	  working	  class	  areas	  discredits	   the	   thesis	   that	  a	  resource	  deficit	  between	  middle	  class	  and	  working	  class	  populations	  explains	  wariness	  of	  migration	  and	  ethnic	  diversity.	  The	  suspicion	  of	  what	  is	  called	  cosmopolitanism	  here,	  when	  it	  does	  indeed	  materialise,	  is	  therefore	  best	  accounted	  for	  elsewhere.	  Namely,	  the	  presence	  of	  ethnic	  minorities	  becomes	  a	  basis	  for	  resentment	  only	  when	  it	  runs	  up	  again	  thickly	  textured	  defensive	  narratives	  of	  the	  nation.ii	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That	   this	   analysis	   is	   often	   forgotten	   is	   perhaps	   on	   account	   of	   the	   melancholic	  visualisations	  of	  the	  working-­‐class	  as	  white.iii	  It	  is	  particularly	  important	  to	  deconstruct	  this	   invocation	  because	   of	   the	   sense	   of	   victimhood	   and	   injury	   it	   offers	   nationalism.	   In	  this	   assessment,	   the	   working	   class	   is	   invested	   with	   whiteness,	   and	   this	   whiteness	   is	  presented	  as	  being	  under	   threat	  by	  migration,	  political	   correctness,	   equalities	  politics,	  and	   the	   very	   idea	   of	   a	   multi-­‐ethnic	   society	   itself.	   	   Leftist	   social	   science	   has	   become	  particularly	   good	   at	   recycling	   this	   canard;	   a	   canard	   in	  which	   class	   exclusion	   is	   either	  used	  to	  explain	  all	  other	  features	  of	  modernity	  and/or	  white	  interviewees’	  testimonies	  on	   the	  dangers	  of	  migration	   are	  presented	  as	  unmediated	   social	   truths.	   In	  both	   cases,	  proper	  analyses	  of	  culture	  and	  race	  go	  missing.	  These	  articulations	  occur	  in	  a	  wider	  left	  discursive	  environment	  that	  too	  often	  presumes	  the	  historic	  entitlement	  of	  ‘indigenous’	  white	  working-­‐class	  people.	  Weaned	  on	   soap	  operas,	   the	  memory	  of	   a	  Blitz	   spirit,	   the	  golden	   era	   of	   the	   welfare	   state,	   and	   football	   as	   it	   used	   to	   be,	   many	   left	   vanguardists	  indulge	   this	   position	   by	   distinguishing	   the	   entitlements	   of	   the	   white	   working	   class	  against	  the	  illegitimate	  claim	  to	  the	  same	  made	  by	  ‘new	  migrants’.	  	  When	   left	   scholars	   claim	   that	   the	  white	  working	   class	   have	  unique	  grievances	   against	  capitalism,	   conterminously	   understood	   as	   legitimate	   grievances	   against	   the	   pressures	  put	   on	   them	   by	   immigration,	   they	   are	   not	   then	   sufficiently	   interrogating	   the	   relation	  between	  whiteness	  and	  the	  nation.	  What	  is	  more,	  they	  are	  conveniently	  constructing	  a	  lived	  reality	  of	  whiteness	  that	  is	  not	  easily	  borne	  out	  in	  many	  working	  class	  multi-­‐ethnic	  neighbourhoods,	   although	   its	   discursive	   operationalization	   does	   certainly	   threaten	   to	  remake	  the	  realities	  of	  these	  areas.	  	  Such	  a	  position	   also	   refuses	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   contingent	  porosity	  of	  whiteness	   and	  how	  its	  symbolic	  ‘wages’	  are	  often	  claimed	  by	  populations	  who	  a	  generation	  or	  two	  ago	  would	  not	  have	  been	  white	  enough.	  It	   is	  through	  this	   lens	  that	  we	  can	  actually	  start	  to	  understand	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  whiteness	  and	  anti-­‐immigration	  sentiments	  coexist,	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  become	  a	  repertoire	  through	  which	  some	  working	  class	  people	  are	   encouraged	   to	  make	   sense	   of	   their	   social	   and	   economic	  marginalisation.	   It	   is	   also	  from	  here	  that	  we	  can	  account	  for	  the	  complexities	  of	  xeno-­‐racism	  as	  they	  characterise	  multi-­‐ethnic	   parts	   of	   our	   cities:	  where	   hostilities	   to	   ‘newcomers’	   can	   be	  mobilised	   by	  those	  who	   claim	  whiteness	   but	   related	   exclusions	   can	   also	   be	   adopted	   by	   some	  black	  and	   minority	   ethnic	   people	   who	   reject	   white	   supremacy	   yet	   favour	   exclusionary	  territorial	   claims	   –	   ‘I	   was	   here	   first’.	   This	   internally	   discrepant	   but	   nonetheless	  majoritarian	  discourse	  of	  exclusion	  is	  in	  fact	  where	  we	  should	  be	  focusing	  our	  attention.	  	  In	   sum,	   the	   left-­‐nationalist	   argument	   hinges	   on	   a	   conflation	   of	   essentialised	   and	  fetishised	   whiteness	   with	   working	   class	   struggle	   and	   anti-­‐capitalism.	   The	   defence	   of	  class	  then	  becomes	  a	  defence	  of	  whiteness,	  and,	  by	  extension	  of	  the	  nation,	  a	  defence	  of	  anti-­‐immigration	  politics.	  This	  reading	  of	  working	  class	  politics	  is	  in	  short	  an	  argument	  for	  nationalism,	  and	  for	  racism,	  and	  inevitably	  harms	  working	  people.	  	  More	  constructively,	  we	  instead	  point	  out	  that	  contemporary	  nationalist	  discourse	  is	  not	  a	   speciality	   of	   the	   working	   class	   but	   has	   historically	   developed	   across	   a	   number	   of	  prominent	  platforms,	  each	  of	  which	  has	  been	  important	  to	  the	  recent	  political	  history	  of	  Western	  Europe.	  These	  multiple	  discursive	  heritages	  include	  but	  are	  not	  limited	  to:	  the	  
liberal	   –	   nation	   in	   relation	   to	   Eurocentric	   interpretations	   of	   tolerance,	   free	   speech,	  secularism,	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  civility;	  the	  neoliberal	  –	  nation	  as	  mediator	  of	  economic	  enterprise	  and	  ‘homo	  economicus’;	  the	  conservative	  –	  nation	  in	  nostalgic	  relation	  to	  the	  provincial,	  imperial,	  Christianist,	  or	  rustic	  white;	  and	  the	  communitarian	  left	  –	  nation	  in	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relation	  to	  the	  welfare	  state	  and	  broader	  anti-­‐market,	  anti-­‐globalisation	  sentiments.	  The	  ideological	  contouring	  of	  nationalism	  at	  the	  present	  moment	  requires	  all	  these	  various	  repertoires.	  	  This	   argument	   constitutes	   therefore	   a	   reminder	   to	   those	   with	   left	   or	   left-­‐of-­‐centre	  leanings	   that	   nationalism	   cannot	   be	   opportunistically	   gamed	   for	   anti-­‐capitalist	   ends.	  Nationalism	   is	   itself	   the	   populist	   play.	   All	   else	   becomes	   marshalled	   in	   its	   service.	   As	  Maya	   Goodfellow	   comments,	   to	   realise	   a	   popular	   politics	   without	   appealing	   to	   the	  totems	   of	   anti-­‐immigrant	   xeno-­‐racism	   might	   seem	   a	   Sisyphean	   task.	   But	   it	   is	   the	  challenge	   that	   must	   be	   reckoned	   with,	   as	   otherwise	   one	  merely	   gives	   succour	   to	   the	  nationalist	   call.	   	  Nationalism	   is	  never	   simply	  a	  means	   to	  other	  political	   ends,	  not	   least	  left	  collectivism.	  Nationalism	  is	  always,	  in	  the	  final	  instance,	  about	  its	  own	  exclusionary	  racisms	  –	  anything	  else	  is	  a	  convenient	  bedfellow	  rallied	  to	  make	  its	  appeal	  more	  likely.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  i	  Just	  as	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  imagine	  that	  the	  city	  is	  the	  unique	  preserve	  of	  the	  metropolitan	  elite	  or	  that	  xeno-­‐racism	  only	  exists	  in	  multi-­‐ethnic	  areas.	  ii	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  all	  historically	  working	  class	  areas	  are	  the	  same	  but	  it	  is	  to	  refute	  the	  general	  argument	  that	  working	  class	  people	  lack	  a	  cosmopolitan	  disposition.	  Similarly,	  we	  note	   that	   those	   susceptible	   to	   strong	  anti-­‐minority	   and	  anti-­‐immigration	  views	  are	  not	  actually	  more	  likely	  to	  live	  in	  areas	  with	  large	  ethnic	  minority	  and	  migrant	  populations.	  See	   for	   instance,	  Rydgren	  and	  Ruth	  on	   the	   ‘halo-­‐effect’	   and	   the	  politics	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  in	  Sweden	  or	  consider	  the	  ‘rural	  heartlands’	  that	  form	  the	  core	  support	  of	  the	  French	  Front	  National.	  iii	  See	   also	   Shilliam’s	   forthcoming	   book,	   The	  Deserving	   Poor:	   Colonial	   Genealogies	   from	  
Abolition	  to	  Brexit.	  The	  book	   traces	   the	  broader	  histories	  of	  how	  the	  emergence	  of	   the	  British	   welfare	   state	   was	   contingent	   on	   broader	   colonial	   conceptions	   of	  a	  deserving	  white	  poor	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	  undesirability	   of	   the	   racialised,	   non-­‐white	   colonial	  poor.	  Shilliam	  offers	  here	  a	  genealogy	  of	  how	  contemporary	  mobilisations	  of	  the	  ‘white	  working	   class’	   as	   a	   political	   category	   speaks	   to	   a	  much	   longer	   and	  deeply	   entrenched	  colonial	  lineage.	  	  
